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Abstract
We report on a recent implementation of Giesbrecht’s algorithm for
factoring polynomials in a skew-polynomial ring. We also discuss the
equivalence between factoring polynomials in a skew-polynomial ring and
decomposing ps-polynomials over a finite field, and how Giesbrecht’s al-
gorithm is outlined in some detail by Ore in the 1930’s. We end with
some observations on the security of the Hidden Field Equation (HFE)
cryptosystem, where p-polynomials play a central role.
1 Introduction and Background
Let Fq denote the finite field with q = p
e elements, p a prime. We use F∗q to
denote the non-zero elements of Fq. The polynomial ring in an indeterminate
X over any field K will be denoted by K[X ] and for f, g ∈ K[X ], f ◦ g = f(g)
represents the composition of f with g. We recall that a permutation polynomial
is a polynomial which permutes the elements of the finite field under evaluation.
A p-polynomial (sometimes called an additive or linearised polynomial) is a
polynomial L ∈ Fq[X ] of the shape
L(X) =
∑
i
aiX
pi
with ai ∈ Fq. More specifically, for any integer s, a p
s-polynomial is a p-
polynomial where ai = 0 whenever i is not a multiple of s. We note that
ps-polynomials are closed under composition (this is simply established).
The problem of completely decomposing a polynomial f ∈ K[X ] into inde-
composable factors, where K is a field, has a long and rich history. When K
is the complex plane, Ritt [23] showed that there exists an essentially unique
decomposition for any chosen polynomial. It is unique in the sense that for any
f ∈ K[X ] in a complete decomposition of f : the number of factors is invariant;
∗author now at Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of Delaware, Newark,
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and the degrees of the factors are unique up to permutation. So, if we have two
complete decompositions
f = f1 ◦ · · · ◦ fm
= g1 ◦ · · · ◦ gn,
then m = n and deg(fi) = deg(gpi(i)) for some permutation pi of {1, . . . ,m}.
Any class of polynomials defined over a field for which this property holds is
commonly said to satisfy Ritt’s theorem. The generalisation of Ritt’s theorem
to all fields of characteristic zero was carried out by Engstrom[10], and Levi[18].
However, for fields of non-zero characteristic, the situation is not so clearcut.
A polynomial is called wild if its degree is divisible by the characteristic p, and
tame otherwise. Any non-linear ps-polynomial is therefore a wild polynomial. A
distinction between the behaviour of wild and tame polynomials arises when one
considers Ritt’s theorem in the context of a finite field. Fried and MacRae[11]
showed that any tame polynomial satisfies Ritt’s theorem. However, Dorey and
Whaples[9] gave an example which showed that not all wild polynomials satisfied
Ritt’s Theorem. Other properties (not discussed in this article) of tame and wild
polynomials are also distinct. However, not all wild polynomials deviate from
tame polynomial behaviour. Specific to this question, Ore[19] showed in the
1930’s that p-polynomials satisfy Ritt’s theorem.
It is interesting to note that p-polynomials over a finite field appear to be
the second class of polynomials shown to satisfy Ritt’s theorem, after Ritt had
established the complex field case. This was not noted by Ore but is evident from
his work: see Ore[19] (Chapter 2, Theorem 4) which gives a statement equivalent
to Ritt’s theorem for p-polynomials. A further class of wild polynomials, known
as (ps, d)-polynomials (or, sub-linearised polynomials) can be shown to satisfy
Ritt’s theorem by using results of Henderson and Matthews[15].
Exponential-time algorithms for determining the complete decomposition of
polynomials were first given by Alagar and Thanh[1], and Barton and Zippel[2].
The first polynomial-time algorithm was published by Kozen and Landau[17],
and separately by Gutierrez, Recio and Ruiz de Velasco[14]. These results were
improved for the tame case over a finite field by von zur Gathen[12]. A general
purpose polynomial-time algorithm for finding a complete decomposition of a
rational function over an arbitrary field was given by Zippel[26]. This last
algorithm provides a method for decomposing any polynomial, wild or tame,
over a finite field. However, one should note that in the wild case, the algorithm
simply finds any complete decomposition, as there does not necessarily exist an
essentially unique decomposition.
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Although p-polynomials were the first polynomials over a finite field shown
to satisfy Ritt’s theorem, they are the latest class of polynomials for which a
polynomial-time decomposition algorithm has been given. The algorithm we
refer to was described and analysed by Giesbrecht[13]. Giesbrecht presents his
algorithm in terms of factoring in skew-polynomial rings but it is well known
(and we later show) that the problem he considers is equivalent to decomposing
p-polynomials over a finite field. We note that any decomposition algorithm
for ps-polynomials can be adapted, at no computational cost, to decomposing
(ps, d)-polynomials. For (p, d)-polynomials this was shown by the authors[5],
following earlier work of Henderson and Matthews[15]. This can be extended
to all (ps, d)-polynomials using the work of Ore[19]. This subject is covered in
another paper under preparation by the authors.
In this article, we report on a successful implementation of Giesbrecht’s
algorithm, making some specific comments concerning the probabilistic part of
the algorithm. We also recall the work of Oystein Ore, showing how Giesbrecht’s
algorithm is equivalent to an algorithm described by Ore sixty years earlier. We
also consider implications of Ore’s work to the security of the Hidden Field
Equations (HFE) cryptosystem.
2 Giesbrecht’s algorithm and the work of Ore
Giesbrecht[13] introduces a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm for obtain-
ing a complete (essentially unique) factorisation of a polynomial in some classes
of skew-polynomial ring defined over a finite field. This problem is intimately
connected to the problem of determining an essentially unique complete decom-
position of p-polynomials, a class of wild polynomials. In fact, there is a one-one
correspondence between factoring in a particular skew-polynomial ring over a
finite field and decomposing ps-polynomials over a finite field.
The skew-polynomial ring Fq[Y ;σ], where Y is an indeterminate and σ is
an automorphism of Fq, is a ring of polynomials with the usual component-
wise addition, and with multiplication defined by Y a = σ(a)Y for any a ∈ Fq
(we simply use juxtaposition to represent multiplication in Fq[X ] and Fq[Y ;σ]).
Since σ is an automorphism of Fq, we must have σ(a) = a
ps for some integer
s. Given the definition of multiplication above, it is easily seen that the skew-
polynomial ring Fq[Y ;σ] is isomorphic to the ring of p
s-polynomials over Fq with
the operations of polynomial addition and composition. Explicitly, the required
isomorphism Φ satisfies Φ(Xp) ◦ Φ(aX) = Y a = apY = Φ(apXp). From this it
follows that composition of ps-polynomials acts in exactly the same manner as
multiplication in the skew-polynomial ring Fq[Y, σ].
The theory introduced by Giesbrecht[13] is developed in its entirety in the
works of Ore[19, 20, 21]. It may be more efficient to implement Giesbrecht’s
algorithm using the ps-polynomial representation of the ring rather than the
skew-polynomial ring representation as set out in Giesbrecht’s article but this
is yet to be tested. While Giesbrecht refers to Ore[20], it is in Ore’s other
two papers that he develops the algorithm which Giesbrecht has rediscovered.
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Giesbrecht’s key contribution is to find a way of computing the crucial step,
which is to find non-zero zero divisors in a small algebra. He does this by using
what he refers to as Eigen rings. Ore[19] discusses the same method in Chapter
2, Section 6 where he uses invariant rings. In particular, Ore’s Theorem 12 of
that section is the key idea in Giesbrecht’s algorithm. Of course, Ore develops
his theory in terms of ps-polynomials rather than skew-polynomial rings. Ore
obtains these results using an earlier paper, Ore[20], where he developed theory
on factoring and primality of polynomials in more general skew-polynomial rings
than discussed here. The problem of developing an algorithm for factoring
polynomials over any skew-polynomial ring remains open.
Recently, a successful implementation of Giesbrecht’s algorithm was pro-
duced by Larissa Meinecke at the University of Queensland using the Magma[4]
algebra package. There is one step in Giesbrecht’s algorithm which is proba-
bilistic in nature, the rest of the algorithm is strictly deterministic. Giesbrecht
gives a lower bound for the probability of this step being successful as 1/9.
We have carried out some testing regarding this step which suggests this lower
bound is very conservative. While we have been unable to determine a worst-
case scenario, in almost all cases tested, the step has been successful on the first
attempt.
3 HFE and p-polynomials
The Hidden Field Equation (HFE) cryptosystem was introduced by Patarin[22].
HFE is a public key cryptosystem and can be described as follows:
1. Choose a finite field Fq, q = p
e, and a basis (β1, . . . , βe) for Fq over Fp.
2. Select a polynomial D of “relatively small degree” with the shape
D(X) =
∑
i,j
aijX
pi+pj
where aij ∈ Fq for all i, j.
3. Choose two p-polynomials, S and T , that permute Fq.
4. Calculate E(X) = S ◦D ◦ T (X) mod (Xq −X).
5. Calculate n1, . . . , ne ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xe] satisfying
E(X) =
e∑
i=1
βini(X1, . . . , Xe)
and publish Fq and the ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ e. The polynomials S, T and D are
the secret keys.
If someone wishes to send a messagem to the owner of E(X), then they sim-
ply calculate E(m) = y and send y. Decryption is carried out by performing the
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following steps. As S and T are permutation polynomials, they have functional
and compositional (modulo Xq − X) inverses. As S and T are known to the
owner, they can determine the inverse polynomials modulo Xq −X (note that
these inverses are also p-polynomials). Thus the recipient of the message y knows
S, D, T , S−1 and T−1. They determine z satisfying S−1(y) = z = D(T (m)).
Next they determine any m1 ∈ Fq so that D(m1) = z. Once m1 is chosen they
determine m = T−1(m1). The middle step is only computationally feasible
because the degree of D is chosen to be “small”.
The security of the system relies on the assumption that if deg(E) is large,
then solving for m in E(m) = y is computationally infeasible. Note that several
m1 ∈ Fq may need to be tried to find a “sensible” message m. This is because
D is not necessarily chosen to be a permutation of Fq as the authors of HFE
assumed that this may be too difficult. However, Blokhuis et al.[3] have since
given examples of permutation polynomials from this class.
Note that it makes no difference whether the polynomial E or the set of e
polynomials ni is published if the basis used is known. In fact, an attacker need
not know the basis chosen as they may choose any basis to reconstruct a differ-
ent, but effectively equivalent encryption function (see the discussion below). If
E is constructed from the e polynomials ni using a different basis, alternative
secret keys S, T and D may be obtained and used to decipher messages.
The HFE system is one of a family of cryptosystems which use functional
composition. Recently, some general attacks for these systems were developed
by Ye, Dai and Lam[25]. An attack which targets HFE specifically has been
published by Kipnis and Shamir[16]. This is general in nature and is quite
successful, but does not break HFE in all cases. This attack has since been
improved by Courtois[7].
Polynomials with the shape D are known as Dembowski-Ostrom (DO) poly-
nomials, see Dembowski[8], Coulter and Matthews[6] and Blokhuis et al.[3]. For
any p-polynomial L ∈ Fq[X ] and any DO polynomial D ∈ Fq[X ], L◦D andD◦L
are both DO polynomials. In other words, DO polynomials are closed under
composition with p-polynomials. Also, it can be established that the reduction
of a DO polynomial modulo Xq −X is again a DO polynomial. The HFE de-
scription given above works in exactly the same way as that given by Patarin[22]
precisely because of the above comments, coupled with the well known fact that
any function over Fq can be represented by a polynomial in Fq[X ] of degree less
than q and a well known result concerning linear operators (discussed below).
Kipnis and Shamir[16] note several problems an attacker faces when they
consider this scheme. We address some of their concerns here. In the original
description of HFE, two linear transformations (or linear operators) over the
vector space Fep are chosen, rather than two linearised polynomials as described
above. Kipnis and Shamir comment that “these mixing operations have natural
interpretation over Fp but not over Fpe , and it is not clear apriori that the e
published polynomials over Fp can be described by a single univariate polyno-
mial G over Fpe”. In fact, there is a natural interpretation. Roman[24] (pages
184-5) shows that every linear operator on Fep can be represented by a linearised
polynomial over Fpe . So the description of HFE as given above is equivalent.
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As DO polynomials are closed under composition with linearised polynomials
and their reduction modulo Xq − X still results in a DO, we are guaranteed
that the published polynomials can be described by a single univariate polyno-
mial: it must be a DO. Kipnis and Shamir continue “Even if it exists (a single
univariate polynomial), it may have an exponential number of coefficients, and
even if it is sparse, it may have an exponentially large degree which makes it
practically unsolvable”. As the resulting polynomial is a DO polynomial, it has
O(e2) terms (compare to a random polynomial which has O(pe) terms), which
is not exponential. Certainly, the degree may be large. It remains our objective,
then, of finding a method of reducing the size of the degree.
We can make more comments concerning the univariate description of HFE
given above. Let E(X) be the public key, which is a DO polynomial. Suppose
we can determine p-polynomials L1 and L2 which are permutation polynomials
and satisfy L1 ◦ f ◦ L2 = E. Clearly, f must also be a DO polynomial. Then
we can decrypt any message sent to the owner of E using exactly the same
method used to decrypt in the standard way, but using the polynomials L1, L2
and f , providing the degree of f is sufficiently small. Of course, it may not
be possible to determine p-polynomials that permute Fq which are left or right
decompositional factors of E(X). However, when considering this problem, the
following result by Coulter and Matthews[6], immediately draws our attention.
For any a ∈ Fq and any polynomial t ∈ Fq[X ], define the difference polynomial
of t with respect to a by ∆t,a(X) = t(X + a)− t(X)− t(a).
Theorem 1 Let f ∈ Fq[X ] with deg(f) < q. The following conditions are
equivalent.
(i) f = D + L, where D is a Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial and L is a p-
polynomial.
(ii) For each a ∈ F∗q, ∆f,a = La where La is a p-polynomial depending on a.
This result provides an alternative definition of DO polynomials and establishes
an important connection between DO polynomials and p-polynomials.
Let E be the published DO polynomial used in the HFE cryptosystem. We
wish to find L1, L2 and D satisfying E = L1 ◦D ◦L2. For the remainder, we set
f = D ◦ L2 so that E = L1 ◦ f and underline that f is also a DO polynomial.
Our objective is to determine some information regarding L1. By Theorem 1,
∆E,a is a p-polynomial for any choice of a. Moreover, we have
∆E,a(X) = E(X + a)− E(X)− E(a)
= L1 (f(X + a))− L1 (f(X))− L1 (f(a))
= L1 (f(X + a)− f(X)− f(a))
= L1 ◦∆f,a.
Thus for any non-zero choice of a, the polynomial L1 is a left decompositional
factor of ∆E,a. Ore[20] shows that there exists a left and right decomposition al-
gorithm similar to the well known greatest common divisor algorithm for a large
class of non-commutative polynomial rings (note that, in general, commutativ-
ity for composition does not hold). He uses these results in Ore[19] to establish
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and describe such algorithms for p-polynomials specifically. In particular, using
a variant of the Euclidean algorithm, we can determine the Greatest Common
Left-Decompositional Factor (GCLDF) of two p-polynomials. This suggests the
following method of attack to determine the polynomial L1.
1. Choose distinct elements a1, a2 ∈ F
∗
q .
2. Calculate L(X) = GCLDF(∆E,a1(X),∆E,a2(X)).
3. Test to see if L is a left decompositional factor of E. If it is, then L1 = L
and we are done.
4. If L is not a left decompositional factor of E, then choose a new a ∈ F∗q, dis-
tinct from previous choices, and calculate L(X) = GCLDF(L(X),∆E,a(X)).
Return to Step 3.
We make the following observations. Step 3 can be carried out in time O(logp(deg(E)))
so has complexity much less than the Euclidean algorithm calculation required
in step 2 or 4. Note also that as Ore’s work does not extend to DO polynomials,
one cannot simply calculate GCLDF(L(X), E(X)) to obtain L1.
As mentioned, Giesbrecht’s algorithm determines a complete decomposition
of a p-polynomial in probabilistic polynomial-time. However, this does not
mean we can determine L1 methodically by completely decomposing L after
step 2. Due to the nature of Ritt’s theorem, we are not guaranteed that in a
full decomposition the proper factors of L1 would be determined strictly on the
left. Further, the number of possible full decompositions is exponential in the
number of indecomposable factors. We make no claims at this point concerning
the number of GCLDF calculations required in step 4 to determine L1. It may
require O(q) such calculations, making the algorithm no better than exhaustive
search. Finally, we note that this attack does not necessarily break HFE as
the DO polynomial may not have a non-trivial GCLDF and even if it did then
the resulting DO polynomial may not be of “sufficiently small” degree. We
are undertaking further research to analyse this attack and to determine other
methods of attacking HFE using the connections between the DO polynomial
and ps-polynomial classes.
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